He has also published extensively on figures and problems in the history of philosophy, particularly in the area of 17th century philosophy and on German Idealism, as well as on the nature of reason and reasons. He is currently at work on a book about the nature of freedom. Research Statement In recent years, Charles Larmore has published work primarily on three topics in the area of moral and political philosophy. The first has to do with the foundations of political liberalism, and particularly with the nature of the principles by which a liberal political order can hope to respect the equal worth of each individual citizen while remaining neutral with regard to their differing conceptions of the human good.
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What is its guiding spirit? One can call this ideal neutrality, if one bears in mind two facts: 1 that the neutrality in question is neutrality with respect to controversial views of the good life, not to morality as such; 2 that such neutrality ought to be justified without appeal to controversial to conceptions of the good.
Neutrality is not skepticism—the primary motivation is not epistemological but moral. This raises the question: how should neutrality be justified? This strategy Larmore terms individualism and he attributes it to Kant and Mill.
According to individualism, we ought to always maintain only a contingent allegiance to any substantial view of the good life because what really matters is autonomy Kant or individuality Mill. These romantic views are reasonable. We ought, therefore, to look for a different type of justification, one which the romantic, too, could accept. The justification must fall between two extremes: claiming a comprehensive and controversial doctrine, on the one hand, and being a merely strategic consensus, on the other.
The latter faces the problems of: a inherent instability, and b deriving moral principles from prudence. The norm of rational dialogue states that people should respond to disagreement by retreating to beliefs they share in order to a resolve the disagreement and vindicate one view, or b bypass it and appeal only to the common ground. The second part of the norm obtains when a cannot be pulled off.
From the norm of rational dialogue, it only follows that we should follow a certain procedure if we want to establish political principles, not that we ought to continue to talk once we reach disagreement.
This last step requires an appeal to the norm of equal respect for persons. That norm — the idea that each is an end to be respected—rules out coercive means of resolving the argument.
It insists that any coercive principles must be as acceptable to you as to me. Both norms, Larmore thinks, are neutral with respect to individualism and romanticism.
They do suggest a certain kind of individualism — that individuals must respect the rights of others, and that those rights must be independent of controversial ideals of the good —but not the individualism of the contentious sort. To rehearse the argument: If our aim is to devise principle of political association and if we are resolved to respect each other as persons in this effort, then the principles to be established must be ones which are justifiable to everyone whom they are to bind.
If, in this attempt at justification, we meet with reasonable disagreement, then we should fall back on common ground and determine what principles can be derived on that basis.
Acceptable political principles must thus conform to the cardinal principle of neutrality toward controversial views about the good life Hence, political liberalism. This argument makes two assumptions: 1 that everyone accepts the two norms in question, and 2 that people are interested in devising political principles. Then, Larmore compares his view to Rawls. First, he denies a reading of Rawls view in which political liberalism does not express a correct or true moral conception.
He withholds a specific notion of true, not truth as such. If one adopts a weaker, non-metaphysical conception of truth, Rawls should be happy to say the norms in question are true.
Shatilar Political Liberalism Sign in Create an account. Young — Editor Price: Request removal from index. By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines — religious, philosophical, and moral — coexist within the framework of democratic institutions.
CHARLES LARMORE POLITICAL LIBERALISM PDF
Charles Larmore together with John Rawls is among the pioneers of the idea of political liberalism for a summary of his earlier view, see here. What emerges out the wake of this process of collapse —in the 16th and 17th century —was a new problem for justifying political authority: namely, the fact that reasonable people disagree about the good. Political liberalism opts for the second path. Or, perhaps, when peers disagree, people ought to backtrack and recant their original views.
Larmore identifies two such problem:. Political Liberalism in Social and Political Philosophy categorize this paper. An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. Leading theorists explore the concept of political liberalism. This last step requires an appeal to the norm of equal respect for persons. But, that assumption is perhaps no longer justified, given the increasing globalization of international capitalism.